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INTRODUCTION 
 
The German Wars of Unification between 1864 and 1871, which united the North German 
Confederation with the southern states, received only limited academic attention overall. 
Historians throughout Europe, more so in Germany, engaged primarily with political and 
military aspects of the conflicts whereby they focused strongly on Prussia and rarely 
accounted for other German states. In the field of cultural and social history, however, there is 
a significant lack of publications. Despite the historical importance of these wars, especially 
the Franco-Prussian War, the subject is often overshadowed by the global, more multifarious 
conflicts of the twentieth century which aroused the interest of academics. Therefore, research 
in this field is far from exhausted and the topic offers much room for further investigation.  
In English-speaking countries, the post-1945 general literature on the German Wars of 
Unification is limited.1 Although Prussia’s wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870-71 have received 
some treatment, it is evident that the wars were more of political rather than military interest 
to historians.2 The existence of only two major publications in English language on the most 
important of these wars, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, indicates this lack of interest 
outside Germany; both Michael Howard and Geoffrey Wawro have presented a general 
history of the war from the military perspective. In Germany, on the other hand, academic 
                                                            
1 The most important English works on warfare in the German Wars of Unification are: Arden Bucholz, Moltke 
and the German wars, 1864-1871 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Philipp Elliot-Wright (ed.), 
Gravelotte-St. Privat, 1870: End of the Second Empire (Oxford: OUP, 2000); Stig Förster & Jörg Nagler (eds.), 
On the Road to Total War. The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1997); Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (London: Harper Collins, 1961); Dennis 
Showalter, The Wars of German Unification (London: Bloomsbury, 2004); Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-
Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 (New York: CUP, 1997); Geoffrey Wawro, The 
Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-71 (New York: CUP, 2003). 
2 Works in English language were published on the political problems the German Wars of Unification had 
posed: Lynn Abrams, Bismarck and the German Empire 1871-1918 (London: Routledge, 2006); David 
Hargreaves, Bismarck and German Unification (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991); Joseph Vince Fuller, 
Bismarck’s Diplomacy at its Zenith (Cambridge: CUP, 1922); David G. Williamson, Bismarck and Germany, 
1862-1890 (London: Longman, 1998). 
 
 
interest in this field had been greater and works had been produced particularly in anniversary 
years of the war. Yet, despite the immense importance of the war for the history of Germany, 
a surprisingly limited number of works in German had been published in the period between 
1945 to 1990.  
After 1990, the Franco-Prussian War began to arouse increasing interest among German 
academics; the variety of unexamined facets this war offered attracted not only military 
historians, but also sociologists and economic historians. The primary goal of the Prussian 
military system, the indoctrination of discipline and obedience through hard drill and training, 
doubtlessly secured the victories of 1866 and 1870/71; it is certainly not surprising that many 
historians were keen on examining how the Prussian’s managed to produce the most 
disciplined and well-trained army in Europe at the time.3 Additionally, Prussian war planning 
and leadership, especially the style of warfare of its operational mastermind, Chief of General 
Staff Helmuth von Moltke, evoked academic attention.4  
Other German historians, who had repeatedly raised the topic of national thinking in 
their works, however, had devoted thoughts to less military subjects.5 Nikolaus Buschmann 
considers the role of heroism and patriotism in the Prussian military system and Heidi 
                                                            
3 Siegfried Fiedler, Kriegswesen und Kriegsführung im Zeitalter der Einigungskriege (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 
1991), pp. 114-121; see also Ursula von Gersdorff &Wolfgang Groote (eds.), Entscheidung 1870. Der Deutsch-
Französische Krieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1970); Ingrid Mayershofer, Bevölkerung und Militär in 
Bamberg 1860-1923: Eine bayerische Stadt und der preuβisch-deutsche Militarismus (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
2010); Dierk Walter, Preuβische Heeresreformen, 1807-1870  (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003). 
4 Fiedler, Kriegswesen und Kriegsführung; Dierk Walter, ‘Roon, the Prussian Landwehr, and the Reorganization 
of 1859–1860ʼ, War in History, 16/3 (2009), pp. 269–297. 
5 Werner Bührer, Volksreligiosität und Kriegserleben: Bayerische Soldaten im Deutsch-Französischen Krieg 
1870/71 (Münster: Boll, 1997); Harald Lönnecker, Studenten und der Krieg 1870/71 (Frankfurt: Ares, 2009); 
Wencke Meteling, Ehre, Einheit, Ordnung. Preußische und französische Städte und ihre Regimenter im Krieg, 
1870/71 und 1914-1918 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010); Thomas Rohkrämer, Der Militarismus der „kleinen 
Leute“. Die Kriegervereine im deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1914 (München: Oldenbourg, 1990); Alexander 
Seyferth, Die Heimatfront 1870/71: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Deutsch-Französischen Krieg  (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 2007). 
 
 
Mehrkens focused more on national thinking and the medical treatment the wounded soldiers 
received in the Franco-Prussian War.6   
Similarly, in regard to publications on German national identity, two major periods can 
be identified, where there was an evidently high level of academic interest in German 
regionalism and nationalism. The first wave of publications occurred in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1870/71 conflict and lasted until the outbreak of the First World War in 
1914.7 In this time, the unification had triggered particularly overwhelming national 
sentiments which resulted in the production of large quantities of heroic literature. Mainly 
memoirs, written by officers and veterans, displayed the Franco-Prussian War as a ‘national’ 
war fought for the cause of German unity. However, these sources featured frequent bias 
opinion whereby the real experiences were often obscured.  
The second major upsurge of publications came in the 1990s and the twenty-first 
century coinciding with the collapse of Communism in East Germany and the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, reigniting historical interest in unification. With this second unification of 
Germany, historians began to recognise the potential and importance of the original in 1871 
for a better understanding and explanation of three key themes: the emergence nationalism as 
a political belief in the nineteenth century; state-building and nationhood; and national and 
regional identity.8 In this period, publications began to appear considering not only the 
                                                            
6 Nikolaus Buschmann, Einkreisung und Waffenbruderschaft: Die öffentliche Deutung von Krieg und Nation in 
Deutschland 1850-1870 (Tübingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2003), p. 142; Heidi Mehrkens, Statuswechsel: 
Kriegserfahrung und nationale Wahrnehmung im Deutsch-Französischen Krieg 1870/71 (Essen: Klartext, 
2008). 
7 Various memoirs and diaries had been published in this period, which glorified the conduct of the Wars of 
Unification. For example, Ludwig Diestelkamp, Freuden und Leiden eines geistlichen freiwilligen 
Krankenpflegers im glorreichen Feldzug des Jahres der Gnade 1870  (Gütersloh: n.p., 1871); Vincenz 
Stubenrauch, Erinnerungen eines bayerischen Kanoniers im Krieg 1870/71 (München: Stubenrauch, 1896); 
Friedrich Freudenthal,  Von Stade bis Gravelotte (Bremen: n.p., 1898); Hans Wachenhusen, Vom ersten bis zum 
letzten Schuss, Kriegserinnerungen 1870/71 (New York: n.p., 1898); Leonard von Blumenthal, Tagebücher des 
Generalfeldmarschalls Graf von Blumenthal aus den Jahren 1866 und 1870/71 (Stuttgart: Blumenthal, 1902); 
Adolf Matthias, Meine Kriegserinnerungen (München: Beck, 1912). 
8 Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley: University of Calofornia 
Press, 1990); Hagen Schulze, The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763-
1867 (Cambridge: CUP, 1991); John Breuilly, The State of Germany. The National Idea in the Making, 
 
 
Prussian state, but historians developed increasing interest in the other German states. The 
unification experience of states such as Bavaria and Württemberg suddenly became popular.9 
Highly relevant contributions to the historiography on this subject had been made by 
Alon Confino and Abigail Green.10 In his book, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, Confino 
covered largely unexplored ground. Due to its political predominance in nineteenth-century 
Germany, most historians tend to focus on Prussia as the prime example of German national 
identity; Confino, however, devoted central attention to the south-western German state of 
Württemberg. What makes his study particularly useful is that he concentrated on how 
regional identities transformed into national sentiments after the unification, exploring the 
symbolic meaning of Sedan Day and the idea of Heimat in Württemberg in the context of 
German nationhood. Abigail Green investigated in a similar area. With Fatherlands, she 
produced a study of state-building in Germany focusing primarily on the states of Hanover, 
Saxony and also Württemberg; this publication displays a unique example in the 
historiography for it compares three non-Prussian states contrary to the common fashion of 
focusing on a single one.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Unmaking and Remaking of a Modern Nation State (London: Longman, 1992); Helmut Berding, Nationales 
Bewusstsein und kollektive Identität (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994); Wolfram Siemann, Vom Staatenbund zum 
Nationalstaat. Deutschland 1806-1871 (München: Beck, 1995); Dieter Langewiesche, Nation, Nationalismus, 
Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa (München: Beck, 2000); Harold James, A German identity: 1770 to 
the Present Day (London, Phoenix Press, 2000); Jörg Echternkamp & Sven Oliver Müller (eds.), Die Politik der 
Nation. Deutscher Nationalismus in Krieg und Krisen 1760-1960 (München: Oldenbourg, 2002); Stefan Berger, 
The Search for Nomality. National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany since 1800 (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2003); Heinrich August Winkler, Germany. The Long Road West 1789-1933 (Oxford: OUP, 
2006); Nancy R. Reagin, Sweeping the German Nation: Domesticity and National Identity in Germany, 1870-
1945 (Cambridge: CUP, 2007); Hans A. Pohlsander, National Monuments and Nationalism in 19th Century 
Germany (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2008). 
9 Werner Bergmann, Bayerns Anteil am Feldzug gegen Preuβen im Sommer des Jahres 1866 (Kirchenlamitz: 
Historische Sammlung Bergmann, 1990); Manfred Hanisch, Für Fürst und Vaterland. Legitimitätsstiftung in 
Bayern zwischen Revolution 1848 und deutscher Einheit (München: Oldenbourg, 1991); Friedmann Schmoll, 
Verewigte Nation, Studien zur Erinnerungskultur von Reich und Einzelstaat im württembergischen Denkmalkult 
des 19. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Silberburg Verlag, 1995); Renata Greguric, Die Haltung Bayerns zur 
"deutschen Frage" zwischen 1866 und 1870 (München: Grin Verlag, 2005); Annette Schießl, Bayern und die 
Reichsgründung 1870/71(München: Grin Verlag, 2007); Ingrid Mayershofer, Bevölkerung und Militär in 
Bamberg 1860-1923: Eine bayerische Stadt und der preuβisch-deutsche Militarismus (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
2010). 
10 Alon Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor. Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 
1871-1918 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Abigail Green, Fatherlands. State-Building 
and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Cambridge: CUP, 2004). 
 
 
In addition to the secondary literature dealing with this time period, there is a great deal 
of primary material available in support of gaining a better understanding of events at the 
time. The most relevant of these are letter, correspondence cards and diaries written at the 
time by the German troops. Most of these sources are in excellent condition up until today 
thanks to archival preservation. This is especially true for collections of letters or diaries 
because they had been kept in private possession and maintained in good condition by the 
authors’ relatives. The majority of existing private accounts of the troops that fought in the 
Franco-Prussian War can be found in German archives; the largest collections are held by the 
Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv in Freiburg, the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich and 
the Hauptstaatsarchiv in Stuttgart.   
These sources describe first-hand wartime experience, giving insight into soldiers’ 
views, attitudes, sentiments, adventures, and encounters with enemy forces; and, above all, 
they had been little affected by governmental censorship. However, it is here where one has to 
carefully evaluate the origin of the source. Despite the fact that each source represented 
authentic and personal attitudes of its author, certain differences can be found depending on 
the social background and rank of the author. For example, the officer rank was granted only 
to highly educated men drawn from the middle class or the aristocracy. They, therefore, 
featured, for example, a broader understanding of politics which they often shared in letters to 
their families. Letters of the ordinary conscript soldiers, however, rather concentrated on 
material needs. Moreover, due to their social background, they had received only limited 
education. In many accounts written by ordinary soldiers, a lack of sufficient writing skills 
was evident so they tended to make use of Feldpostkarten (correspondence cards) or had their 
letter written by comrades.11 There was also still a striking amount of ordinary soldiers who 
                                                            
11 Frank Kühlich, Die deutschen Soldaten im Krieg von 1870/71. Eine Darstellung der Situation und der 
Erfahrungen der deutschen Soldaten im Deutsch-Französischen Krieg [Online]. Available: 
http://frankkuehlich.de/dissertation.htm, part I., sect. 4.2. [no pagination]. 
 
 
were unable to read and write; particularly the Prussian provinces eastwards of the river Oder 
featured a high illiteracy rate.12  
  The archives also provide access to printed primary material such as contemporary 
newspapers, governmental papers and pamphlets; all of which carry significant information 
about a variety of factors that are relevant for both the research background and the contents 
of this dissertation. In the war of 1870/71 the media gained in significance in terms of public 
opinion shaping utilising newspapers and other printed sources for the conveyance of national 
sentiments.13 The media itself had been influenced strongly by the government at the time. 
The governments of the various German states had introduced measures during the war to 
ensure civilians were informed about war events. For example, in Saxony, all newspapers 
were obliged to print announcements of the royal ministries free of charge.14 Newspapers and 
pamphlets displayed one significant instrument of institutions to manipulate public opinion 
and bared insight into official censorship as information had been carefully selected by the 
government.  
There is a lack of available Prussian governmental papers as a result of Allied air raids 
in World War II leading to the destruction of most Prussian official documents. However, the 
Staatsbibliothek in Berlin still hold samples of the Militär-Wochenblatt, a frequently read 
newspaper during the war. In regard to printed sources from other German states and regions, 
research had been far more successful; archives in Stuttgart and Munich hold a vast selection 
of well-preserved contemporary published documents. Moreover, the internet offers a great 
deal of digitised primary material which can be easily accessed via the websites of German 
universities, libraries, or newspaper archives.15  
                                                            
12 Ibid. 
13 Mehrkens, Statuswechsel, p. 22. 
14 Seyferth, Die Heimatfront, p. 371. 
15 A selection of resourceful websites: The University of Bonn, Digital Library [Online]. Available: 
http://s2w.hbz-nrw.de/ulbbn/periodical/titleinfo/429523; Bayerische Landesbibliothek, Digital Library [Online]. 
 
 
This dissertation is seeking to investigate the extent to which national identity was 
already evident in the hearts and minds of the German troops that fought in the Franco-
Prussian War. Before describing the methods and structure, it is necessary to clarify and 
define basic terms which appear throughout this work. The central pillar forms the term 
‘identity’ which describes the unique characteristics determining who or what a person is and 
distinguishing this person from others.16 Applied to the Germany of the nineteenth century, a 
patchwork of many sovereign states and provinces, the importance of the identification with 
the region had occupied a far greater place in peoples’ lives than it can be said for national 
identity.  
The connection of the Germans to their regions and provinces of origins is expressed in 
the term ‘Heimat’. Sociologists and social psychologists have attempted to answer the 
question ‘What is Heimat?’ and have concluded that Heimat is where one is born, where one 
receives an education, comes to consciousness of selfhood, adjusts oneself to family and 
society, or constructs a ‘social entity’.17 The word Heimat has ancient German roots has been 
identifiably present in various German dialects since the fifteenth century, but it was as late as 
the eighteenth century that the small elite of writers and publicists started to infrequently use 
the word, although without particular significance.18 As part of a broad effort in the 1780s to 
restore ancient and neglected words to the language, early Romantic writers recommended the 
adoption of Heimat and began to incorporate it into their vocabulary.19 For almost two 
centuries, regional identities had been persistent in Germany and Heimat has been at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Available: http://www.bayerische-landesbibliothek-online.de/coburger-zeitung1; Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, 
Teltower Wochenblatt [Online]. Available: http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/25128437/; The 
Internet Archive, Published Primary Documents, Franco-Prussian War 1870/71 [Online]. Available: 
http://archive.org/search.php?query=franco-prussian%20war%201870%2F71.   
16 Sara Hawker, & Catherine Soanes (eds.), Compact Oxford English Dictionary for Students (Oxford: OUP, 
2006), p. 501. 
17 Applegate, A Nation of Provincials, p. 5. 
18 Ibid., p. 7. 
19 Ibid. 
 
 
centre of a German moral discourse about place, belonging, and identity.20 Whereas Heimat 
before the German Unification of 1871 described the immediate, local, surrounding areas 
people had lived in, it gained in importance on a national level after the Franco-Prussian War. 
The Germans had difficulties in creating a common ‘national identity’, the identity of 
the German people within one German nation, prior to unification. They struggled to find a 
stereotype in religion, because of the confessional division between a largely Protestant north-
east, and a largely Catholic west and south-east and, politically, there had been weakness and 
fragmentation between the various states.21 According to the early advocates of the national 
idea, the Germans had to build a nation by appealing to the twin forces of culture and history, 
which in turn became the backbone of German national identity.22 From the eighteenth 
century onwards, the idea of the nation had been a popular subject amongst the small elite 
group of intellectuals. Humanist historians such as Beatus Rhenanus or Jacob Wimpfeling 
wrote national histories aimed at glorifying the German nation in which they sought to 
demonstrate that the Germans had much to be proud of.23 These national sentiments had laid 
the basis for what became known as German nationalism. 
In German history, nationalism aimed at the creation of a unified nation accompanied 
by the construction of a ‘national state’.24 German nationalism featured a blend of two 
essential elements: firstly, the myth of a nationally interpreted, glorified past; and secondly, 
the myth of a nation with an even more glorious future.25 Hereby, the ‘nation’ was based on 
the cultural roots of nationhood such as a collective name, language, myth of descent, 
                                                            
20 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
21 James, A German Identity, p. 10. 
22 Berger, The Search for Normality, p. 9. 
23 Ibid., p. 22. 
24 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ʻNationalismus und Nation in der deutschen Geschichte‘, in Berding, Helmut (ed.), 
Nationales Bewuβtsein und kollektive Identität. Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewuβtseins in der 
Neuzeit 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), p. 163. 
25 Ibid., p. 167. 
 
 
religion, history and so on.26 It seems questionable, however, whether an intensified 
awareness of a common language and culture could alone provide the motive spring for 
German nationalism in the early nineteenth century.27 The ‘nation’ is a fluid concept that 
changes its meaning in accordance with the particular variant of nationalism it endorses; it is, 
therefore impossible to fix on a definite definition of the word ‘nation’.28 In Germany, where 
cultural identity had coexisted for centuries with multiple regional, local and religious 
identities, the relationship between nationalism and ‘pre-national’ loyalties and identities had 
been vague.29 It is evident that, although initially hesitant, the German Unification of 1871 
acted as a national catharsis providing a basis for national identity and a piece of common 
history for the German population.30 
As it has been explored above, there is a great deal of literature available concentrating 
on German national thinking, the emergence of nationalism, the concept of Heimat that are 
relevant to the time period covered in this dissertation. The Franco-Prussian War and the 
subsequent unification of Germany, occurring within a single year (1870/71), offer a great 
deal of academically unexplored facets, including the creation of national identity amongst the 
German troops. In the field of German national identity in this era, contributions had been 
made by few historians. Particularly, the consequences and impact of the unification upon the 
German populations had been examined. Besides the previously mentioned publications by 
Alon Confino, Celia Applegate and Abigail Green, one of the core texts used in this 
dissertation is Heidi Mehrken’s Statuswechsel, in which she pointed out the changing statuses 
soldiers experienced during the war and emphasising the factors responsible for the 
perception of national thinking. In addition, a unique contribution had been made by Frank 
                                                            
26 Green, Fatherlands, p. 2. 
27 Robert M. Berdahl, Robert M., ‘New Thoughts on German Nationalism’, The American Historical Review, 
77/1 (Feb., 1972), p. 69. 
28 Green, Fatherlands, p. 3. 
29 Ibid., p. 4. 
30 Ibid., p. 6. 
 
 
Kühlich. In his work on the German troops’ wartime experiences, he provided a detailed 
analysis of how ordinary soldiers interacted with other contingents.   
In an attempt to demonstrate how differently national identity had been perceived 
amongst the German troops, dependent upon social backgrounds and state of origin, special 
emphasis will be placed upon the troops from Bavaria, Prussia and Württemberg in this 
dissertation. All three states featured fundamentally different regional cultures and traditions, 
thus, comparisons can be drawn. Particularly, in the field of military traditions, a great deal of 
dissimilarities can be found; the military background of each of these states is of importance, 
influencing the way certain contingents fought in the war, for it also represented an inherent 
part of regional customs. Furthermore, it will be important to consider the consequences of 
the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 as it hindered some troops, particularly the Bavarians, to 
fully comprehend the idea of fighting alongside Prussia in 1870/71.  
Moreover, a comparative study of these three states displays a unique contribution to 
existing literature on the subject. It adds a different dimension to research in this field for it 
will deal not merely with the experiences of whole societies, but specifically with the 
perceptions of the troops. The topic examines a narrow aspect of one under researched subject 
in German history, conducting a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which a national 
identity began to unite the German armies in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 that can be 
placed within the context of existing publications. The central pillar represents the troops’ 
views and attitudes towards each other and whether they had been able to identify with a 
German nation as a consequence of the war they fought. Thus, the research topic involves a 
combination of military, social and cultural aspects in order to highlight different angles of the 
problem and benefit the understanding of the development of a common German national 
identity after unification. 
 
 
Throughout this dissertation, the author attempts to answer the following questions in 
order to clarify the Problem of National Identity within the German Armies during the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71: 1) What was the role of regional identity in wartime 
experience? 2) Which factors encouraged national thinking? 3) What were the external 
influences upon the troops’ national understanding? These questions will be answered in three 
separate chapters based on the evaluation of primary material, including letters, diaries, 
correspondence cards and newspapers provided by the archives in Berlin, Freiburg, Munich, 
Stuttgart, and the University of Bonn. This seems a logical sequence of analysis, beginning 
with a closer perspective involving the troops’ experience, which then gradually expands as 
the chapters progress, looking at the wider picture of the troops’ perceptions and national 
sentiments and eventually the troops’ legacy and subsequent ramifications of the war. 
The first chapter discusses the first-hand experiences, troops’ relations and wartime 
routine. While examining the troops’ relations and interactions with each other and 
identifying possible problems in their social behaviour during the war, it will be also 
necessary to particularly explore the relations between the different contingents and how they 
dealt with subordination to Prussian commanders. Their cooperation with the Prussians and 
the apparent difficulties the troops from Bavaria and Würrtemberg had faced due to their 
origin will also be examined. Hereby, it will be important to explore the existence of any 
noticeable discriminations, prejudices or reputations allocated to certain contingents. The 
second part of the chapter will then focus on the regional traditions that were expressed by the 
troops. Social and cultural activities, including the singing of marching songs, the performing 
of artistic and physical activities, they had enjoyed in their spare time off the battlefield often 
affected their war motivation and attitudes and represented elements of their civilian lives. 
The second chapter will focus on the wider perspective of the possible emergence of a 
‘national identity’ as a development of wartime events. Hereby, it is essential to point out 
 
 
which factors contributed to the development of national thoughts in the mind-sets of the 
German troops during the war and how this affected their attitudes. Particular elements that 
highlighted and influenced the troops’ thoughts about their own national character will be 
examined: mobilisation and the creation of a common enemy. In order to examine the extent 
to which national identity had already taken root in the mind-sets of the troops in the 
mobilisation phase, the first section will deal with the troops’ mood at the outbreak of war 
including the spirit at the time of mobilisation and the enthusiasm for volunteering. Hereby, it 
will be important to explore the differences and similarities in the mobilisation process and 
the general mood of citizens as an influence upon troops. The second section will focus on 
how the creation of an enemy image aided the strengthening of national belief. Most 
relevantly, the view the German troops held of the enemy and how the creation of a common 
‘national’ enemy had influenced national identity.  
The third chapter will focus upon the extent to which the perception of the war had 
changed and what measures were taken by the government and media in order to forge 
national sentiments amongst the troops and how this had influenced the troops’ national 
thinking. Moreover, it will be highlighted how the war had been displayed in soldiers’ 
memories and, in return, how the dead had been displayed in the aftermath of the war. After 
the final peace settlement on 10 May 1871, the writing of memoirs became a popular exercise 
amongst war veterans who felt to share their experiences with the public.  
The Franco-Prussian War represented a prime example of how actual wartime 
experience had been transformed by the media and government in order to foster national 
sentiments amongst the regionally dissected German population. However, memories are not 
a mere reflection of the recruits’ battlefield experience; the gratification about positive events, 
such as the German Unification on 18 January 1871 and the following armistice on 26 
January, played a key part in the blurring of actual experiences. Some historians have pointed 
 
 
out that the foreseeable unification had been an important tool utilised by the media and 
government at the time in order to encourage national thinking.31 However, what was the 
contribution of all these factors in the creation of a common sense of ‘Germanness’ amongst 
the disparate German armies that fought in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71?   
 
I. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL IDENTITY IN WARTIME EXPERIENCE 
 
In order to examine the role of regional identity and how it had affected the disparate German 
armies who fought in the Franco Prussian War of 1870/71, close attention has to be drawn 
towards the troops’ relations, wartime routine and experience.  This chapter will focus on the 
troops’ relations and interactions with each other and the identification of problems in their 
social behaviour during the war. Hereby, it will be necessary to particularly explore the 
relations of the different contingents and how they dealt with subordination to Prussian 
commanders. How did they cooperate with the Prussians or where there any difficulties 
soldiers from the southern states had faced due to their origin? Were there any noticeable 
discriminations, prejudices or reputations allocated to certain contingents? In the second part, 
it will be highlighted how regional traditions were expressed by the troops through certain 
social and cultural activities, including the singing of marching songs, the performing of 
artistic and physical activities in their spare time off the battlefield and how this affected their 
war motivation and attitudes.  
When investigating the relations between the troops, Frank Kühlich identified four main 
types: the relation between the troops amongst themselves; the relation of the different units 
and regiments among themselves; the relation of the troops to officers; and the relation of the 
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troops to the supreme leadership.32 Possibly, it can be suggested that it was in the first two of 
these relations where the practicing of regional traditions would have been most common. 
Although, some of the wartime letters, which had been examined for this work, provided 
insight into relations between ordinary soldiers and high ranking officers, it is questionable to 
what extent they can be viewed as viable sources for regional identity in practice.  
In placing emphasis upon values such as order, discipline and respect, the hierarchical 
system and structures within the German armies at the time ultimately relied upon the 
subordination of the regular troops to high ranks. Thus, in the German Wars of Unification, 
troops of remotely similar ranks were most likely to gather in social groups and 
simultaneously experienced their wartime routine; hereby, it is also likely that soldiers from 
the same region had come together in small groups to socialise, as it applied to regiment units, 
because they shared a common regional connection. It was in these groups where social and 
cultural wartime activities would have created a more comfortable environment for troops in 
which they were able to practise regional customs to a greater extent than it was the case in 
company of high ranking officials.  
Relations amongst the ordinary troops represented the most intimate level of interaction 
due to the regular basis upon which the soldiers were a part of each other’s daily life. It 
became evident that a social hierarchy emerged amongst the troops themselves; hence, the 
social groups they had created in wartime had reflected, to a large extent, those found in civil 
life. The statuses and hierarchies were dependent upon the social status each individual 
soldier possessed in peacetime civilian life including their occupations and background. So it 
was common that, amongst the ordinary troops, ‘one-year volunteers’ saw themselves for 
having certain privileges.33 The presence of ‘one-year-volunteers’ had maintained the 
                                                            
32 Kühlich, Die deutschen Soldaten. 
33 One‐year volunteers had been drawn largely from the educated middle class. The basic requirement for 
volunteering had been a certificate to prove the conclusion of some form of higher education. For more 
 
 
hierarchal order amongst smaller groups during the war. These volunteers mainly 
distinguished themselves from other conscripts in terms of level of education, 
communicational and social manners, all of these factors had been eminent in civil life.34  
The social differences that were carried onto the battlefield, in combination with the 
limited space in which the troops had cohabited, often led to difficulties and tensions between 
volunteers and conscripts. It was not unusual that these factors had created a ‘superiority 
complex’ held by the volunteers over their fellow soldiers. Apart from an immense lack of 
individual privacy, the volunteers believed that, due to their superior social status, they were 
allowed increased material wealth and certain privileges over their lower ranked comrades. 
One example for this displayed the fact that some volunteers employed ‘poorer’ conscripts for 
menial tasks, including cleaning, as it was common in peace time.35 However, often it was 
mentioned that it was difficult to find soldiers to fulfil these tasks due to the devaluing desire 
for money during the war.36 In contrast, the volunteers’ arrogant behaviour was perceived by 
the conscripts as a sign of weakness and cowardice, while on the other hand the conscripts 
were discriminated for their lack of education.37 Generally, these condescending views the 
‘one-year-volunteers’ had expressed towards the conscripts can be attributed to the social 
hierarchy and the system of values as it was found in most German states of the nineteenth 
century. It is questionable, therefore, that such discriminations amongst ordinary troops had 
been the result of regional dissimilarities. 
In addition, differences in communication and social behaviour had imposed certain 
barriers for the conscripts. Men from lower social classes had often featured limited 
experience and education. The majority of soldiers came from rural villages where they spent 
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a monotonous life which significantly lacked excitement and adventures; their familiar 
environment often enclosed only a few miles of the areas which surrounded their villages.38 In 
comparison to troops from the educated middle class, ordinary soldiers had travelled little. So 
it came that for most of them the train ride to the front in the summer of 1870 had been their 
first step outside the familiar Heimat39 and, thus, highlighted an especially excited experience; 
an adventure that had often been recalled in primary sources.40 
As Kühlich pointed out, the regional background of the troops had impacted upon their 
experience in wartime and, especially ordinary soldiers, found it difficult to familiarise 
themselves with social standards and languages. For example, troops from lower social 
classes commonly addressed their comrades informally with Du; an informality which the 
one-year-volunteers constantly rejected as a sign of insufficient education. The various 
dialects, such as the Platt Deutsch of many soldiers from North Germany, also imposed 
difficulties in understanding and interaction.41 It was also not unusual for ordinary troops to 
mistake the certain German dialects for French.42 
The identification with their contingents and units also played an important role in the 
troops’ wartime experience and, thus, revealed certain reputations and prejudices as a result of 
regional features. Hereby, it is important to mention that the contingents that formed the 
German armies in 1870/71 had belonged to entirely different war parties in the earlier Austro-
Prussian War of 1866. Seven of the twenty-five north German divisions and thirteen of the 
thirty-one German line infantry divisions who took part in the Franco-Prussian War had 
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fought on the Austrian side in 1866.43 Although, a limited amount of tensions and disputes 
flared among the troops of the different contingents, major collisions had been mainly 
avoided. It can be argued, however, that the German troops were largely unfamiliar with each 
other when it came to regional customs and traditions; this was due to the fact that most 
soldiers identified themselves primarily with the province or federate state they came from.44 
Sources revealed that the contingents of the different parts of Germany held a friendly 
attitude towards each other and commonly described themselves as ‘brothers’.45 In Memoires 
of Bavarian soldiers, some evidence can be found that, instead of expressing snide remarks, a 
rather positive and even sympathetic attitude had been adopted regarding Prussian troops:  
Uns Soldaten ging das Herz auf, als wir unsere 
(preußischen) Kameraden erblickten, mit denen wir uns 
berufen fühlten, den Wohlstand und das Glück des theuren 
Vaterlandes zu schützen und dem Übermut des Erbfeindes 
Schranken zu ziehen.46  
 
Here, Stubenrauch referred to the Prussian troops as ‘our comrades’, placing them on an equal 
level to himself, which clearly indicated that he had faith in the Prussian military as well as he 
held no prejudices or doubts regarding a successful cooperation. However, he explicitly 
pointed out that this cooperation had mainly served the purpose of protecting the (German) 
fatherland against the common French enemy; such expressions were especially predominant 
in written memoirs constituted after 1871 and were only rarely mentioned in letters of 
ordinary soldiers. It can be argued, therefore, that the thought of the contingents fighting 
                                                            
43 Kühlich, Die deutschen Soldaten, part I., sect. 3.5., [no pagination]. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Stubenrauch, Erinnerungen, p. 10; Translation: ‘Our hearts were filled with joy as we saw our (Prussian) 
comrades with whom we felt appointed to protect the wealth and the glory of the dear fatherland and to 
challenge the presumption of the hereditary enemy’. 
 
 
united for one German state had been heavily inspired by the unification process which 
created a subsequent, though not persistent, notion of national identity.47 
Often, it had been the case that the coincidence with Prussian troops before or during 
battle unleashed a certain feeling of relief amongst combatants of other contingents, 
particularly Bavarians. A Bavarian soldier of the Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment recalled 
his encounter with Prussian forces:  
Nun kamen zwei Bataillone Preußen, ich glaube es waren 
die Neunundfünfziger. Stramm und musterhaft, die Pfeifer 
an der Spitze das „Preußenlied“ spielend, zogen sie im 
Walde an uns vorbei. „Nur man frisch drauf los, Bayern!“ 
riefen sie uns zu; nun kam auch bei uns wieder neues 
Leben und frischer Mut in die Kompagnie.48 
 
The way in which Kühnhauser described his observation of Prussian troops highlighted 
primarily the great increase in motivation he and his Bavarian company had gained from this 
experience; this was further strengthened by the melodic background created by the pipers. 
Moreover, referring to the allied forces’ appearance as ‘brisk and exemplary’, it can be argued 
that the observer viewed his fellow combatants with a certain amount of respect and looking 
up to them, to some extend even appreciating their presence. Thus, it can also be interpreted 
that the Prussian troops had enjoyed a fine military reputation.  
Particularly for the Bavarian forces, one of the reasons for appreciating the company of 
the Prussians during the war was arguably the instability of their own military system. The 
Bavarian military system underwent a significant transformation during the late 1860s when 
the Bavarian government decided to adopt Prussian regulations and methods. It was then, 
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when ‘Bavaria, at the high point of celebrating its national uniqueness, lost its independence to 
Prussia’.49 The unsatisfactory outcome of the war of 1866 had created important impulses for 
basic reforms in the Bavarian Army constitution: on 30 January 1868, general conscription 
had been introduced which meant that young men from all social backgrounds had to fulfil 
military service and not only those from lower classes of population.50 However, this was only 
a fractional amount of change in the slow-moving transformation. The defeat and the 
ineffectiveness of Bavarian troops in the war of 1866 ‘had revealed the flaws of the heavily 
criticised Bavarian Army; it was, however, prohibited under the circumstances to loudly praise 
the Prussian system’.51 The reason for this was that the Bavarian population had expressed 
discontent about the reforms out of reluctance towards Prussia.52  
Although, it can be argued that the majority of prejudices had vanished, this rather 
reserved attitude of the Bavarian population towards Prussians had been carried into the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71. Despite the positive reputations the Prussians had featured 
during the war, there is some evidence which suggested that certain prejudices had been 
present. For example, particularly Bavarian troops identified negative characteristics of the 
Prussians such as their conceited and arrogant behaviour as well as a lack of sentiment.53 It 
was relatively rare, nevertheless, that soldiers were linked to contingents by certain reputations 
or were even discriminated by troops from different contingents.  
Selected primary and secondary material, however, often indicated that the Bavarians 
displayed an exception to this. Contemporary historians, who had conducted research in the 
field, identified several shortcomings of the Bavarian forces in training as well as in stamina 
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that had been apparent during military campaigns in 1870/71 they had been engaged in.54 In 
addition to the problems that came with the adoption of the Prussian military system, the 
Bavarian troops were often criticised by their fellow Prussian combatants. Even though it was 
generally well-known that the Bavarians had fought with a brave and vehement attitude, they 
were criticised for their lack of discipline and persistence; their congenial nature also featured 
a lack of organisation and orderliness, which was rejected by most Prussian soldiers.55 These 
Bavarian shortcomings became especially visible in battles and in the fulfilment of tasks 
which belonged to the military routine. For example most Bavarian soldiers featured unkempt 
appearance and insufficient marching performance so that often they were incapable to 
maintain the Prussian standard tempo and fall behind.56  
The behaviour of Bavarian troops during the war of 1870/71, especially when 
confronted with the enemy, had remote consequences for the outcome of most battles. 
Nevertheless, Prussian officers saw themselves struggling occasionally with the relatively low 
standards of Bavarian military education. As Ingrid Mayershofer stated, ‘The Bavarians 
seemed to have been insufficiently prepared for the challenges this “modern war” had imposed 
on them’ had led to significant disruptions due to Bavarian dissatisfactory performances.57  
During battle, Bavarian soldiers rarely attacked with the bayonet and proved willing to 
voluntarily carry wounded comrades to the rear of the battlefield, leaving gaps in the firing 
line.58 In addition, Prussian analysts discovered after the war that Bavarian infantry had 
needed to be resupplied with ammunition once, as a minimum, in each encounter with French 
troops, whereas the Prussians rationed the ammunition that had been allocated to them; to 
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resupply the Bavarians had been a time-consuming process that involved conveying crates of 
reserve cartridges into the front line and distributing them.59 Similarly, Bavarian recruits were 
insufficiently drilled and had been sent to the front after receiving only two weeks of military 
training.60  
These shortcomings had contributed to the vast losses the Bavarian Army had suffered. 
G. von Hoesslin wrote in a letter to his mother on 1 November 1870 that 34 of the original 52 
soldiers in his unit had been wounded, killed, or had become seriously ill; by 11 December 
Tanera’s brigade had dwindled from 192 officers and 7000 men to 40 officers and 2124 men.61 
Hoesslin further described the exhaustion his fellow combatants had suffered: 
Our faces were pale and haggard, and morale sank because 
of the enormous strains and the continuous marches, which 
almost went in circles without seriously encountering the 
enemy […] Through sickness our ranks dwindled in an 
alarming manner, and it was no rarity for 15, even 20 men 
from a company to be left behind because of exhaustion, 
who would then drag themselves along again on a wagon 
or on food at night.62  
 
This illustrated that the Bavarians, in contrast to the Prussians, lacked the discipline, the 
training as well as the substance to meet the challenges this war posed. Therefore, high 
casualties were inevitable which then had a major psychological impact upon the Bavarian 
soldiers’ attitudes before entering following battles. The Prussians, on the contrary, had 
proved more resistant to such experiences, carried out their war duties and, therefore, were 
much more able to recover faster from unexpected and costly battles.63  
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Contemplating relations between the troops, their officers, and their supreme leadership, 
the questions emerge to what extent the soldiers from different contingents had been able to 
subordinate themselves and how they adapted to the idea of being led by Prussian 
commanders. Most soldiers were used to accepting their subordinate social position and to 
respect their superiors. 64It was common that the commanding officer was sympathetic to his 
troops and was often viewed as a fatherly figure by his men. However, distinct hierarchical 
relations as they were present in the Prussian German army of 1870/71 did also create the 
potential for conflicts. For example, incidents of officers abusing their powers occurred 
regularly which was reflected in their handling of minor offences committed by the soldiers.65 
Relatively frequently officers had used physical violence to enforce their authority. 
Although, the application of this form of violence was prohibited, during the Franco Prussian 
war many soldiers had been beaten by their superior officers; this was especially common 
among East German units.66 The reasons for this behaviour included cowardice and a lack of 
zeal. As a general rule, these abuses had been tolerated by the majority of soldiers without 
resistance and dissent and were seldom mentioned in letters. This was largely due to the 
military education which highlighted the utmost importance of the soldiers’ duty to be 
obedient.67 During the war, soldiers rarely complained or revolted against this harsh treatment, 
mainly because of their willingness to obey and accept the hierarchical structures within the 
army. 
A similar obedience was also held by the troops towards the supreme leadership which 
was characterised by their implicit faith. The Prussian soldier Ernst Kirsch wrote in a letter 
addressed to his wife: ‘Wir sind ihnen [den Franzosen] in jeder Weise überlegen, wir fühlen 
die sichere feste Leitung Moltke’s und das gibt Vertrauen, der beste moralische Hebel für die 
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Armee.’68 The main cause for this faith can be explained with the traditional willingness to 
abide by rules and regulations which was embedded in the lower classes, the main source for 
army recruits and was most common for Prussian troops. Furthermore, this faith had been 
strengthened by the great victories in the first half of the war. For example, the leadership had 
been only rarely blamed of holding the responsibility for the high number of casualties these 
victories inflicted in the documents. Criticism of military actions had been subject to only the 
politicians and the leadership itself.69 The Prussian king, Wilhelm I, as well as the 
commanders in chief, Prince Friedrich Karl, General von Steinmetz and Crown Prince 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Preussen, enjoyed particular popularity not only amongst Prussian 
troops. In letters there are indications that at every occasion these characters are present, they 
were greatly celebrated by the troops of the various states who responded via loyalty and 
attachment.70 
In both wars, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, 
the strong regional connectivity of the various German troops can be identified by examining 
their relations and interactions with each other which become visible in wartime routine. In 
1866, Germany consisted of a lose set of various states which represented certain individual 
regional customs and habits. The food they cook, the way they dress and how they spoke; all 
of which had been implemented parts of each state’s cultural tradition. Clearly, these traditions 
have persisted throughout the following war of 1870/71 until today.71 Troops from different 
states such as Bavaria, Württemberg and Prussia identified themselves differently through 
regional traditions; however, they shared a similar connectivity to their home region. It can be 
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argued that particularly wartime interactions and activities had been carried out in almost the 
same manner as they had been carried out in peacetime; in wartime these traditions appeared 
in limited fashion due to the fact that ordinary troops had been materially equivalent and had 
only limited resources, including food or clothes, available. 
In regard to social and cultural activities practised in the troops’ spare time off the 
battlefield, the war had provided limited possibilities. In civil life, sports such as swimming 
and gymnastics played were considered commonplace, however the war provided little 
opportunity to practise physical activities. Because most spare time activities were forms of 
communication and social activities, the soldiers spent more of their time with a focus on the 
written word and, more importantly, the spoken word. Besides mere conversations, the most 
meaningful activities included the performing of improvised theatre, but most relevantly the 
singing and playing of music.72 Therefore, the participation in musical performance, practiced 
in regiment chapels, occupied a central role in the soldier’s spare time; the songs sung were 
dominated by themes of humoristic nature but also by patriotic and melancholic lyrics. The 
majority of the ordinary soldiers featured a tendency towards infantile behaviour which was 
expressed as childish games and masquerades.73 On the contrary, educated war combatants 
preferred to spend their free time in officer casinos enjoying card games and socialising.74 
Moreover, the written word was of immense importance to them as this becomes evident in 
the vast amount of existing letters in which officers had expressed the frequent demands to 
obtain information and newspapers.75  
An important element to how regional identity was expressed during the war was the 
mental connection the soldiers maintained to their Heimat through cultural activities such as 
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singing songs and engaging with rumours and humour. The nature of the songs sang during 
both the war of 1866 and that of 1870/71 had been identified as a reliable source of how the 
lyrics of marching songs and similar texts had functioned as a conveyer of regional identity to 
the battlefield. For example, in 1870/71 troops from Pomerania had identified themselves with 
their region of origin in the Pommernlied: ‘Wenn in stiller Stunde Träume mich umwehn, 
bringen frohe Kunde Geister ungesehn, reden von dem Lande meiner Heimat mir Hellem 
Meeresstrande düsterm Waldrevier’.76 The terms ‘Lande’ and ‘Heimat’ clearly underpinned 
the heavily regionally infused identity and indicated the love and pride of the Pomeranian 
troops not for a united German state, but for their region. 
The Prussian marching songs from 1866 and 1870/71, for example, had been of 
similarly patriotic nature. The Prussian officer Werner Deussen described the effect of songs 
upon his soldiers, telling that they marched with joy, music and positioned flags even in bad 
weather and were driven by the harmony and the power of the music and their voices; the 
most popular marching songs, because of their motivating lyrics, were ‘Ich bin ein Preuße 
kennt ihr meine Farben, Die Wacht am Rhein, and, later, Heil dir im Siegerkranz’.77 In the 
lyrics, they identified themselves with the regional fatherland, in this case Prussia, but towards 
the end of the Franco-Prussian War, marching songs had featured a more nationalist character 
regarding a whole German nation; this, however, will be further outlined in the second 
chapter. 
Above all, such activities had served the purposes of strengthening the troops’ morale, to 
overcome fear before battle action or to counter the depressive mood after costly battles.78 To 
strengthen the soldiers’ morale and encourage collective behaviour, church music as well as 
marching music was highly popular.  During the battles of 16, 18, 19, and 20 August, the band 
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played famous German praying songs, such as ‘Jesus meine Zuversicht’, which were always 
chosen wisely as the troops were facing death and were surrounded by dying and wounded 
soldiers; therefore, they needed to be taken away from the dark thoughts of death, and be 
familiarized with the feeling of success.79 This was valid for troops of all contingents as it 
seemed as if the mere presence of Prussians had a motivating effect on soldiers from different 
states. 
Overall, it became evident that, during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, regional 
traditions had persisted. However, ordinary soldiers from the different contingents were only 
limitedly able to practise them. The most striking factor was that identity had been expressed 
through the social class system which was in place and remained intact in each of the German 
states at the time. So it came, that soldiers from the educated middle class and aristocracy, 
including high ranking officers and one-year volunteers, had been likely to make use of their 
status in order to gain certain privileges. The conscripts drawn from the lower classes had 
traditionally obeyed to their superiors, as it had been the case in peacetime; this was 
particularly evident for Prussian troops who had been part of a long-standing military system 
which was based on a traditional hierarchical structures. The outlined prejudices and 
reputations had been mainly allocated to Bavarian soldiers who were insufficiently trained and 
lacked most of the Prussian standards.  
Furthermore, neither was there sufficient evidence of language posing adamant barriers, 
nor any social or cultural activities which could be identified as purely regional. Clearly, some 
soldiers had difficulties in understanding certain German dialects, but this had been largely an 
issue of a lack of education rather than a product of cultural rejection. Social activities and 
interactions were also based on hierarchy. The singing of songs, both Heimatlieder and more 
nation-related songs, and other artistic performances had been carried out by troops from all 
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participating contingents alike and had a similar impact upon them: they were a welcome 
distraction to the strains the war had imposed and a motivation at the same time. 
 
II. FACTORS WHICH ENCOURAGED NATIONAL IDENTITY DURING THE WAR 
 
In this chapter, the emphasis will be placed upon the wider perspective of the possible 
emergence of a ‘national identity’ as a development of wartime events. Hereby, it is essential 
to point out which factors contributed to the development of national thoughts in the mind-
sets of the German troops during the war and how this affected their attitudes. This chapter 
firstly examines the troops’ mood at the outbreak of war including the spirit at the time of 
mobilisation and the enthusiasm for volunteering. Hereby, it will be important to explore the 
differences and similarities in the mobilisation process and the general mood of citizens and 
troops in the states of Prussia, Bavaria and Würrtemberg. To what extent had national identity 
taken root in this early phase of the war? The second section will focus on the major factors 
and influences that had contributed to a greater national belief; the most relevant of which was 
the view the German troops held of the enemy and how the creation of a common ‘national’ 
enemy had influenced national identity. How had the perception of the enemy troops, 
population and encounters with armed civilians contributed to a greater sense of 
‘Germanness’ amongst the disparate armies in 1870/71? 
Having commenced as a military alliance in mid-1866, the creation of the North 
German Confederation had brought together various German states, dominated by Prussia, 
under a common constitution in 1867.80 However, particularly the largely catholic southern 
                                                            
80 The constitution of the North German Confederation had been finalised on 16 April 1867. The states of Baden, 
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southern German states had been economically connected to the North German Confederation through the 
German customs union or  Deutscher Zollverein which had been introduced in January 1834; For detailed 
information confer Deutscher Zoll, Offizielle Website des Deutschen Zolls [Online]. Available: 
 
 
German states had rejected joining such a confederation under protestant Prussian rule, mostly 
out of reluctance of having to sacrifice their own constitutional independence. In the primarily 
conservative Bavarian kingdom, this view had been further fuelled by the devastating defeat it 
had suffered against the Prussians in the war of 1866.81 Considering dissimilarities in 
religious views as well as political differences present at the time, it will be important to 
examine what effect the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870/71 had upon the general 
mood of the populations; how difficult was it to mobilise southern German troops for a war 
under Prussian command?  During the mobilisation phase in July 1870, there were differences 
in the mood of the populations and the speed of the mobilisation process.  
War enthusiasm had been significantly higher in Prussia than it was the case in southern 
German states; this was particularly true for young men who felt eager to be part of a larger 
community and longed for excitement.82 The Prussian student Adolf Matthias recalled waiting 
hours under a hot sun on 15 July 1870 just to catch a glimpse of King Wilhelm I. of Prussia 
when his train passed through from Bad Ems to Berlin: ‘Never’, he wrote in his diary, ‘have I 
seen such passion as were released by those magic words, “der Krieg ist erklärt”. Officers, 
civil servants, professors, students, merchants, we all sang Heil dir im Siegerkranz, Die Wacht 
am Rhein, Ich bin ein Preusse, kennt ihr meine Farben, and Deutschland, Deutschland über 
alles’.83 This statement showed the dynamic mood sweeping Prussian students at the outbreak 
of war and highlighted their desire for adventure.  
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The amount of young men volunteering for the war in Prussia indicated the popularity 
of the war even further.84 The main reason for this was that the war was viewed by most 
young men as a sort of amusement, an opportunity to escape from dull daily life and routine; 
for most of them the trip to the front had been the first major journey in their lives.85 
Therefore, in this initial phase, the war had been seen by countless young Prussian men as a 
joyful, positive experience so that possible downsides and consequences were seldom 
mentioned in testimonies or memoirs.86  
It can be argued that the mobilisation process in Prussia had liberated national 
sentiments in the mind-sets of most recruits. The Prussian soldier Richard Gädke wrote to his 
parents in July 1870:  
Hurrah! Es ist wirklich Krieg! Hoch König Wilhelm und 
hoch Deutschland! […] Das wird ein fröhlicher, frommer 
Krieg werden. Nieder mit den Galliern und ihrer Frivolität. 
In sechs Wochen können wir bereits die erste Schlacht 
geschlagen haben! Seid um mich nicht besorgt. Sterbe ich, 
so sterbe ich fürs Vaterland, bleibe ich leben, so mache ich 
großes Glück.87  
 
Especially striking in this letter was the willingness of Gädke to enter this war at any cost as 
well as his overly excited mood to be part of this great adventure. In the extract of his letter he 
praised not only the Prussian king, but also the German state; the following negative 
expression about the ‘Gallic’ enemy88, and the belief to sacrifice his life for a worthy purpose 
indicated that, presumably, he went to war for the German nation rather than for the Prussian 
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87 BA/MA, MSg 1, 1300 Richard Gädke, letter to his parents, 21.7.1870; Translation: ‘Hooray! We are really at 
war! Cheers to King Wilhelm and cheers to Germany! […] This will be a happy, divine war. Down with the 
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me. If I die, I die for the fatherland, if I live, I will bring great luck.’ 
88 The views the German troops held towards their French enemy and how this contributed to national perception 
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state. However, in his statement, Gädke had failed to clearly identify what he viewed as his 
Vaterland.  
The euphoria the outbreak of war had created had captured largely the young population 
and had been primarily existent in urban areas amongst the educated upper and middle 
classes. Recruits drawn from the lower classes, which included the majority of ordinary 
soldiers, held a rather reserved attitude. Thomas Rohkrämer pointed out that most of the letter 
written in dialect, for him a sign of traditional living circumstances, had displayed little 
enthusiasm for the war; this social group had reacted to mobilisation with a mixture of 
feelings including uncertainty and misery.89 Furthermore, he highlighted that strong national 
sentiments had not been present, but the war had been rather viewed as a misfortune that had 
deprived families of their provider.90   
Enthusiasm for the war can also be found outside of the North German Confederation. 
In Bavaria, similar to the mood in Prussia, euphoria broke out in major cities and had thrilled 
a significant part of the male Bavarian population. Florian Kühnhauser described the 
assembly of troops in Munich in July 1870:  
In allen Landestrachten und aus allen Ständen, der Bauer 
neben dem Beamten, der Arbeiter neben seinem 
Fabrikanten, der Sturtzer neben dem Theologen, kamen sie 
alle je nach der Größe zu stehen; in wenigen Minuten 
machte der blaue Rock Stand und Rang gleich, alle waren 
Soldaten und Vaterlandsverteidiger.91 
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This statement indicated that men from all social classes had been present at this gathering. 
However, it is questionable whether they had been present in equal proportions; thus, 
assumedly, it was mainly the young male population in Bavaria who had been most 
significantly affected by war enthusiasm.92   
However, it can be argued that particularly in Bavaria it was evident that, although the 
outbreak of war had eradicated most anti-Prussian and local patriotic sentiments, mobilisation 
had been difficult. Kühlich had identified the Bavarian Palatinate as the region with the most 
reluctant and rejecting attitudes towards fighting alongside the Prussians.93 Here, where 
Prussian troops had been deployed during the mobilisation phase, they had been confronted 
with repellent reactions by the population; this war largely due to financial strains they had to 
bear for accommodating Prussian soldiers.94 Kühnhauser recounted a conversation amongst 
villagers near Traunstein when one man expressed his anti-Prussian sentiments: ‘Ja, ja—die 
Preuβen! Die Preuβen haben wieder was Schönes angerichtet; das ganze Bayernlandl geht 
noch mit dieser preuβischen Freundschaft zugrunde […].’95 Hostile feelings towards the 
Prussians had persisted primarilay in rural areas.  
In the primarily conservative Kingdom of Bavaria, the willingness to join Prussia in a 
war and, above all, national sentiments lacked in the hearts of the vast majority of Bavarian 
people. In comparison to Prussia, the number of volunteers in Bavaria was considerably low. 
One example of the reserved Bavarian mood during the mobilisation phase was displayed in 
the city of Bamberg. Only one third of the students volunteered for the war and the overall 
percentage of Bavarian recruits from the educated classes had been between two and five per 
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cent.96 The civil population in the catholic city of Bamberg remained largely unaffected by 
war euphoria. This had been expressed in the absence of a ceremonial send-off of the regional 
troops on the day they had been leaving to the front, the 23 July, when no national sentiments 
had been shown on the side of the citizens.97 Clearly, this had a negative impact upon the 
mood and motivation of the troops in the Bamberg regiments. Here, the sense to fight for the 
German nation was of limited nature or was entirely absent in the mind-sets of troops and 
civilians and as a result only a few volunteers had been drawn.98 
In Würrtemberg, in contrast, mobilisation went smoothly and expectations of fighting 
alongside the Prussians had been high. Other than the Bavarians, the Würrtemberg 
government and population had admired the Prussian military state and proved an exceptional 
willingness to adjust their own army to Prussian standards.99 After the adoption of Prussian 
military regulations, Stuckow sent some of his officers, amongst them General von 
Brandenstein, to observe Prussian drill methods.100 It can be argued that the positive image 
members of the Würrtemberg government held of the Prussians also had a reassuring effect 
upon the population, hence, the troops who had been drawn from this population. Soldiers 
from Würrtemberg, part of the German Third Army under Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, were 
quickly mobilised; on 17 July, the mobilisation of Würrtemberg soldiers was ordered and ten 
days later the field division, consisting of 21,740 men, stood fit for service at the Rhine.101 
Although, the troops initially struggled to get used to Prussian rigour, they had adapted to 
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Prussian standards fairly quickly.102 There is little evidence of a negative military reputation 
of Würrtemberg troops.  
Besides the largely smooth-running mobilisation processes and the enthusiastic mood 
amongst the populations in major German cities, it can also be said that national sentiments 
had mainly taken root in the minds of young men, particularly students. Moreover, in Prussia 
this mood was of an exceptional extent. It is questionable, however, whether the majority of 
soldiers, drawn from the lower classes, went to war for a ‘nation’. A type of national identity 
had been present at the outbreak of war; however, this was rather due to group dynamic 
factors than to an actual desire for a united German state.103  
As the war progressed, one can identify possible catalysts for the strengthening of 
national identity amongst the German troops, including the views and attitudes they held 
towards the French enemy and its nation. Hereby, the way in which the enemy was viewed 
had impacted upon how the German troops viewed themselves. Encounters with French 
troops, Franc-tireurs, or the Turkos had been perceived differently and had shaped a certain 
prejudiced picture of the French population that had evoked antipathy, thus greater national 
sentiments, amongst the German combatants.104 France, in retrospect, had been seen as the 
major military threat to nineteenth-century Germany. Besides its geographical position, the 
memories of the Napoleonic Wars of 1803-1815 and the wars of liberation of 1813-1815 
weighted heavy in the hearts of most Germans. The sentiments of these times had been 
reignited by Napoleon III’s war declaration on Prussia in July 1870, prompting the Germans 
to recall the long-standing image of the French enemy.105 
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What exactly was this image and how had it evoked togetherness amongst different 
German states? Primarily, the general perception was that of France as the aggressor. The 
French were held responsible for provoking this war so that it was ultimately the role of the 
German population to counter such aggression.106 In addition, the majority of Germans 
believed that joining Prussia in a war against France was thoroughly justified considering past 
French hostilities.107 In the letters of soldiers, negative remarks concentrated mainly on the 
figure of Napoleon III, however, occasional Francophobe expressions had been made by high 
ranking officers.108 It was the German civilian population who frequently referred such 
antipathy towards the whole of the French nation; this was relatively rare in letters of 
soldiers.109 
Regarding the French regular forces, again, there are some indications of feelings of 
antipathy which derived from the countless stereotypical nicknames they had been given. For 
example, German soldiers referred to them most commonly as ‘Rothosen’, ‘Hallunken’, 
‘Schufte’ or simply “Feind”, often attributed by the term ‘feige’.110 Clausewitz’s concept of 
‘hostile feelings’ attempted to explain how these feelings occurred in combat between 
soldiers:  
Essentially combat is an expression of hostile feelings. But 
in the large-scale combat that we call war hostile feelings 
often have become hostile intentions. At any rate there are 
usually no hostile feelings between individuals. Yet such 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Schwäbischer Merkur, 171 (22 July 1870), p. 753; Christine G. Krüger, ‘German Suffering in the Franco–
German War, 1870/71ʼ, German History, 29/3 (2010), p. 414.  
106 Kühlich, Die deutschen Soldaten, part I., sect. 5.1., [no pagination]. 
107 Ibid.  
108 A selection of letters in which German troops expressed a negative attitude towards Napoleon III or his nation 
include Wilhelm Antoine, letter to his parents, 18.07.1870; Walter Bauchmüller, letter to his sister, 04.09.1870; 
Gustav Bosch, letter to his sister-in-law, 07.11.1870; Bernhard Hartmann, letter to his wife, 25.12.1870; these 
letters can be found under The University of Bonn, Kriegsbriefe 1870/71 [Online]. Available: http://s2w.hbz-
nrw.de/ulbbn/nav/classification/1468447.  
109 Kühlich, Die deutschen Soldaten, part I., sect. 5.1., [no pagination]. 
110 Heidi Mehrkens (ed.), ‘Militärangehörige: Deutsch-französischer Krieg 1870/71 in Frankreich und 
Deutschland im Krieg (18.-20. Jahrhundert): Zur Kulturgeschichte der europäischen „Erbfeindschaft“’, (März 
2005), p. 102 [Online]. Available: http://rzbl04.biblio.etc.tu-
bs.de:8080/docportal/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/DocPortal_derivate_00001699/Darstellung_nach_Kommuni
katorengruppen.pdf;jsessionid=3BFB402FC3DC40807819ABFEA06879B8. 
 
 
emotions can never be completely absent from war. 
Modern wars are seldom fought without hatred between 
nations; this serves more or less as a substitute for hatred 
between individuals.111  
 
A similar process took place in the war of 1870/71 between German and French troops when 
‘soldiers not only had hostile intentions, but often hate their opponent as members of the 
opposite side, members of the other nation’.112 These feelings both influenced the attitudes of 
the Germans towards the French enemy and their identification with the German nation.  
Contact with French forces had often been described in a careless, frivolous manner, 
partly because the enemy had not been taken seriously and his military effectiveness was 
downplayed. :  
So gingen wir etwa eine Stunde lang vor, lagen zeitweilig 
auf dem Bauch und verloren dank der schlechten Schüsse 
der Franzosen nur etwa 12 Mann meist leichtverwundet. 
Unser kleiner Lieutenant von Röll bekam einen Schuβ in 
den rechten Oberarm. Er rief: „Es lebe der König“ und 
schwupp hatte er einen dito in den linken Arm. Mir flog 
eine schon etwas schlappe Kugel durch den Kinnbart, riβ 
einige Borsten aus und verwundete meinem Nebenmann 
die eben erhobene Hand nicht unbeträchtlich.113 
 
This statement showed how German soldiers occasionally made battles appear ridiculous by 
pointing out insufficient French shooting skills. Downgrading the enemy’s ability to fight 
assumedly required the Germans to think about their military knowledge in a superior fashion. 
What had started as small-scale distinction between two armies had developed into large-scale 
comparisons between two nations. It can be suggested that it was the Germans, not the 
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Bavarians or Prussians, who were displayed in this statement as the stronger party in the war, 
to a certain extent indicating the military superiority of not only one contingent but the whole 
German nation. 
The development of certain prejudices and stereotypical thinking had been relatively 
common on the side of the Germans. During the war, the French troops were criticised for 
their lack of skill and diligence when it came to the fulfilment of tasks where particular 
attention to detail was vital, for example, at outpost service or shooting.114  Additionally, the 
Germans strongly condemned French lack of discipline and frequently commented on their 
slender appearance; terms such as ‘Kerlchen’, ‘Schwächling’, ‘Nussknacker’, ‘Hanswurst’ 
had been commonly used by German soldiers to describe the appearance of French recruits 
and further clarified the enemy image.115 It can be argued that the filtering out of the 
opponents’ weaknesses had required a certain amount of assurance about the own qualities.  
Particularly, French armed civilians, or Franc-tireurs, as they had performed ambushes 
relatively frequently in the second half of the war provoked heavy critique amongst the 
German combatants and, especially their leadership.116 To reduce Franc-tireurs actions, the 
German military had introduced certain counter-measures at the end of August 1870. For 
example, an order had been issued that French prisoners of war had to identify themselves as 
combatants through visible badges; all others had to be taken to war courts and, if they were 
found guilty for illegal participation in the war, had to expect a death sentence or ten years of 
forced labour in Germany.117  
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In general, German soldiers shared the view of their military leadership that the 
interference of civilians into war-related events was illegitimate. However, these encounters 
were a popular topic in German war letters for the reasons that they occasionally displayed an 
exciting change in outpost service routine, and they were dismissed as ‘deceitful’ actions.118 
The French regular forces had been frequently criticised by the Germans for not ‘playing by 
the rules’ and fighting in a ‘dirty’, ‘undisciplined’ manner; this was part of the created image 
of the Erbfeind; this term, meaning ‘inherited enemy’, became increasingly used by historians 
to describe Franco-German relations in that time.119 The Bavarians, for example, had expected 
to fight a ‘manly enemy whom they could see and recognise as such, an enemy who would 
not shoot and then run, hide or pretend to be an innocent civilian’.120 The way the enemy 
nation behaved in this war had often been viewed as ‘immoral’ and ‘disgraceful’, 
characteristic features that opposed to German values and ideals. The cultural ideal of 
‘Germanness’ at the time implemented an image of the obedient citizen to König and 
Vaterland, hence soldiers; troops from all German contingents predominantly identified 
themselves as honest, loyal, brave, indulgent and warm-hearted.121 Therefore, it can be argued 
that these values had been part of a national identity, or a greater sense of ‘Germanness’, as 
they had been fuelled by the ‘misbehaviour’ of the enemy nation.  
Particularly apparent became the troops’ identification as what can be called ‘higher 
human beings’ due to their German origin, when confronted with French colonial troops, 
Turkos.122 These colonial troops played a significant role in the intensification of an enemy 
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image and the strengthening of ‘Germanness’ in the mind-sets of most German soldiers. 
According to Kühlich, the refusing attitude towards the Turkos stemmed from ‘their exotic 
nature and strangeness which displayed an entirely new experience for most German 
soldiers’; this notion of uncertainty quickly developed into hatred, attributing the African 
combatants to a particular cruel and wild character.123  
Amongst other things, rumours circulated in the German armies that Turkos 
treacherously opened fire upon German troops from ambush and so contributed to their 
reputation as ‘wild, ruthless animals’.124 Furthermore, some evidence can be found that 
German combatants believed the Turkos continued fighting with wounded soldiers and 
subsequently abused and mutilated their victims.125 Most prejudices and reputations the 
German soldiers held towards the Turkos were prompted by the German government and 
military leadership and served the purpose of deepening morale and national togetherness by 
displaying the Germans as the superior peoples. In essence, however, it was the French 
themselves who had been held responsible for exposing the German troops and people to such 
terrible cruelties:  
The cruelties and sexual bestialities that the turcos and 
Arabs committed against the wounded are according to 
their stage of civilization, not so much to be imputed to 
them but to the European government that, knowing about 
their customs, leads these African hordes to the theatre of 
war.126 
 
Here, Bismarck himself had spread apparent Turkos behaviour amongst his people. There is, 
however, some evidence which suggested that these endowments of national meaning, taken 
by the German government, had been partly successful, as will be outlined in the next chapter.  
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In conclusion, it can be said that the two possible catalysts for a greater national 
sentiment amongst German troops in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 outlined in this 
chapter had partly succeeded. The mobilisation phase of July 1870, therefore, contributed to a 
type of war enthusiasm, involving groups of people in the whole of Germany, which had not 
been experienced before to an equal extent. Although, this enthusiasm and euphoria had 
affected primarily young, educated men, its existence and infectious nature cannot be denied. 
In Prussia, evidence for this can be found in the high number of volunteers. However, also in 
the Bavarian capital the mood at the outbreak of war had been a positive one. Rural areas 
were an exception where a large number of recruits had been drawn from; men who lacked 
the time to be concerned with great national sentiments for their worries lay with their 
families at home. The notion of entering a war against a common enemy had been partly 
present in all German regiments. The perception of this war as a ‘national’ war derived from 
the creation of a stereotypical enemy image which included not only French soldiers, but also 
developed into a German struggle against the French nation and civilians. ‘Uncivilised’ and 
‘deceitful’ actions and fighting methods of Franc-tireurs and Turkos further encouraged the 
existing German image of the French’s illegitimate style of warfare and, thus, gave reason for 
identity as the ‘superior nation.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF GERMAN UNITY AND THE LEGACY OF THE WAR 
 
After the final peace settlement on 10 May 1871, the writing of memoirs became a popular 
exercise amongst war veterans who felt to share their experiences with the public. The 
Franco-Prussian War represented a prime example of how actual wartime experience had 
been transformed by the media and government in order to foster national sentiments amongst 
the regionally dissected German population. The term ‘memory’ refers to the faculty by 
which the mind stores and remembers information, whereas experience means the practical 
contact with and observation of facts or events that leave an impression on one.127  
However, memories are not a mere reflection of the recruits’ battlefield experience; the 
gratification about positive events, such as the German Unification on 18 January 1871 and 
the following armistice on 26 January, played a key part in the blurring of actual experiences. 
Some historians have pointed out that the foreseeable unification had been an important tool 
utilised by the media and government at the time in order to encourage national thinking, but 
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how persistent did this notion prove to be?128 This chapter will focus upon the extent to which 
the perception of the war had changed and what measures were taken by the government and 
media in order to forge national sentiments amongst the troops and how this had influenced 
the troops’ national thinking. Moreover, it will be highlighted how the war had been displayed 
in soldiers’ memories and, in return, how the dead had been displayed in the aftermath of the 
war. 
With the series of joyful events, including the unification of the German states which 
was followed by an armistice and finally the ceasefire, the troops at the time associated one 
particular feeling: relief. There is little doubt that the announcement of the war’s ending and 
the adjunctive joy of returning home, re-uniting with their beloved family, had been shared by 
Prussians, Bavarians, high and low ranks alike. It is questionable, however, whether the 
majority of soldiers were aware that they returned home as ‘heroes of a unified German 
nation’, celebrated by the population, the media, and the government. It can be argued that 
such sweeping notions had affected a returning soldier if he was vulnerable to psychological 
manipulation, group pressure or collective hysteria. Those soldiers who let themselves be 
swept away by the flush of victory, wrote their memoirs in the following years in an 
excessively nationalist and patriotic manner.  
The ultimate rewards, during the war as well as after, a soldier could receive for 
extraordinary performances on the battlefield were medals; the most popular amongst these 
was the Iron Cross.129 For example, an officer became a war hero when he held the absolute 
control over his subordinates in dangerous situations in order to lead them to successful 
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medal which be earned by all soldiers, independent from rank and origin; Choppers Club, History of the Iron 
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attacks; whilst the officer played the role as a Führer-Held, the heroic soldier had to prove 
that he could be a cold-blooded fighter within the limits created by his officer.130  
During the war, heroic actions were not only honoured with awards, but it was also 
common to publicise them in newspapers. In the war year of 1870-71, for example, the 
Prussian military newspaper Militär-Wochenblatt issued regularly several pages of summaries 
naming all of those officers and soldiers who impressed the authorities through their superb 
bravery in close contact with the enemy.131 In a military-patriotic writing style, men were 
praised in the following terms: 
In der Schlacht bei Saarbrücken erhielt Vice-Feldwebel 
Sprickmann-Kerkering der 12. Kompagnie, aus Münster, 
mit einem Halbzuge Befehl, eine avancierende feindliche 
Abtheilung durch Salvenfeuer zurückzuweisen. Nach 
einigen, auf sein Kommando abgegebenen Salven meldete 
er sich beim Kompagnie-Chef mit den Worten: „Ich bitte 
abgelöst zu werden, da ich kein deutliches Kommando 
mehr geben kann.“ Eine feindliche Kugel hatte ihm die 
rechte Kinnlade total zerschmettert, kaum vermochte er 
sich noch verständlich zu machen. Jetzt ziert den Tapfern 
das eiserne Kreuz.132 
 
 
The men who found themselves in such a column had not been left untouched by this; 
they were suffused with pride. This pride mingled with the feeling that they had fought for a 
rightful purpose, the national cause, and the knowledge that they had done their job 
extraordinarily well. To many of them receiving an award meant that all their suffering was 
not worthless after all. The Franco-Prussian War, often characterised as the first German 
national war, served as a prime example of how the ordinary soldier, who had served his duty 
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in the war, was transformed into a national hero.133 This transformation occurred when a 
soldier received the full recognition for his actions in war whereby he represented the 
collective confidence in victory in the face of danger, boosting national sentiments.134  
Another factor serving the attempt to create a stronger national thinking amongst the 
troops was speeches and leaflets by kings and government, during as well as after the war. 
Already in the mobilisation phase in July 1870, pamphlets with strong national patriotic 
contents had been handed out. The Würrtemberg editor Otfrid Mylius encouraged not only 
men from his region to participate in the war, but he called upon ‘Alle deutschen Herzen! 
Deutsche Männer! Deutsche Jünglinge!’ to fight with ‘Gott für Nationalität und 
Vaterland!’.135 Appealing to the German armies, the Prussian King also made public efforts to 
encourage national thinking in an announcement on 2 August that read ‘Ganz Deutschland 
steht einmüthig in den Waffen gegen einen Nachbarstaat, der uns überraschend und ohne 
Grund den Krieg erklärt hat. Es gilt die Vertheidigung des bedrohten Vaterlandes, unserer 
Ehre, des eignen Heerdes’.136 Both of these examples featured strong national patriotic 
language and were addressed to all Germans with the purpose of creation sentiments of 
national unity.  
After the war, satisfying feelings, such as the pride to have successfully participated in a 
war against the utter enemy France as well as having taken part in the creation of the German 
nation, significantly overshadowed the actual experiences, especially the sinister ones. As a 
result, in the memoirs the Franco-Prussian War had often been presented as the honest, 
justified war; where exertions and fear moved into the background to give way to joyful and 
heroic scenes.  
                                                            
133 Buschmann, Einkreisung und Waffenbruderschaft, p. 139. 
134 Ibid.   
135 HStAS, E271 c, Bü 964, ʻAufruf an alle deutschen Herzenʼ, Stuttgart, 18.07.1870. 
136 HStAS, E294, Bü 26, ʻAn die Armee!ʼ, Mainz, 02.08.1870. 
 
 
The real experiences indicated that the fear to lose one’s own life was a constant issue, 
but discipline encouraged the troops to overcome it for the moment of battle. However, in 
memoirs the feeling of fear was exchanged with uncertainty about the outcome of a battle, 
especially in the first phase of the war. Carl von Rasp portrayed his feelings during his first 
battle as follows: 
Es war ein eigentümliches Gefühl, das mich in diesem 
Augenblick beherrschte, wo ich zum ersten Mal einem 
Kugelregen entgegen ging. Es war nicht Angstgefühl, doch 
eine gewisse Sorge, was die nächsten Stunden bringen 
würden.137 
 
The reason for such statements was that in memoirs, it was not common to admit fear. In fact, 
the confession of any kind of weakness would not have fitted into the German picture of the 
heroic fighter; the soldier who so courageously sacrificed his own life for the sake of his 
comrades and the German nation.138 The total disregard of the soldiers’ own safety gained a 
new dimension after the war and formed the basis of most of the memoires.  
There is also the indication that the troops’ main thoughts in their writings after the war 
were circulating around their own heroic actions. Hereby, it was common to use a dramatic, 
sometimes even poetic style of language; the usage of exaggerations, superlatives and 
comparisons was very popular. A Bavarian infantry soldier remembered an experience with a 
wounded comrade: 
Soldat Durner traf es im letzten Augenblick, als wir 
abgelöst wurden u. zurückkehren wollten. Er bat mich 
herzlich ihn nicht zurückzulassen. Ich verband ihn 
notdürftig mit meinem Taschentuch u. brachte ihn unterm 
größten Kugelregen u. den schwierigsten Umständen unter 
Beihilfe zweier Soldaten vom Inf. Leib-Rgt. an den 
Verbandplatz u. legte ihn neben G. Leutnant Rau v. der 4. 
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Kompagnie, welcher bereits am Sterben war, worauf ich 
mich von ihm verabschiedete.139 
 
In this extract, it is particularly conspicuous that the wounded soldier was carried to the next 
sick bay under the greatest hail of bullets and the most difficult circumstances. Due to the fact 
that his statement described a minor battle near Vernon on 22 November 1870, it can be 
assumed that he used the superlatives not because they express the his actual experience at the 
time, but to highlight his heroic action to an even greater extent; he also made little effort to 
explain the exact circumstances.  
Another phenomenon is the literal absence of dissatisfactory experiences in most of the 
written memoirs. In the face of all the unpleasant situations, the lack of food and exhausting 
marches the war brought about, it is surprising that memoirs hardly show any evidence of 
sinister experiences. One could speculate that it would only be common sense for combatants 
to exploit the writing of memoirs for the purpose of moaning about the exertions or how their 
governments handled certain situations. Surprisingly, this was not the case. The reasons for 
this were often of psychological nature. Perceptions and memories have a holistic character so 
that chronological experiences exist only as a bundled general impression.140 The time 
between the end of the war and the writing of memoirs amounted to several years, often 
twenty-five years or more. During that time, the veterans’ memory could have been weakened 
significantly, so that it is possible that the way he remembered his experiences in the war 
would be transformed into a generally positive impression.  
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Apparently, veterans carefully selected the information which deserved a place in their 
memoirs; not only the memories which circulated around his own actions, but also those 
which presented the extraordinary morale of the German soldier in a particularly good light, 
as well as the strong company between the troops which always had an impact on them. All of 
this was described on a national level and not on a regional. Memoirs rarely differentiated 
between regional and national troops; they spoke of the ‘German troops’. Particular attention 
had been directed towards the outstanding courage of all German soldiers; this was usually 
mentioned in connection with the massive firepower of the enemy’s weapons Chassepot and 
Mitrailleuse which had earned great respect especially from officers for the devastation they 
had caused.141 Subsequent memoirs aided the creation of an excessively beautified picture of 
a war where the German soldier went into battle against an enemy with superior firepower 
completely motivated and utterly fearless. In order to further emphasise the bravery of the 
German troops in this harsh war, the resistance of the French was often highlighted: ʻAber die 
nur langsam weichenden Gegner wehrten sich tapfer um jeden Fuβbreit Erde und lieβen 
keines ihrer Feldzeichen im Stichʼ.142  
Intensified by the glorious military victories the Germans had achieved over the French 
in the early phase of the war, national sentiments were also popularly recalled by soldiers 
from south German states.143 Bavarian infantry man Florian Kühnhauser expressed how he 
felt about participating in this war:   
Möchten die gewaltigen Waffenthaten der deutschen 
Armee in jener großen Zeit den Söhnen dieser wackeren 
Männer, der Jugend, der Mit- und Nachwelt ein 
leuchtendes Vorbild sein, dann wird die Begeisterung zum 
Wehrstand, die Liebe zum engern und weitern Vaterlande 
hell auflodern, und dann können wir in Tagen der Gefahr 
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wieder ausrufen: „Lieb‘ Vaterland magst ruhig sein! […] 
Deshalb aber rollt doch noch echtes Soldatenblut in 
unseren Adern, und wir sind stolz darauf, teilgenommen zu 
haben an diesen so blutigen Kämpfen und glorreichen 
Siegen, als Mitgründer des so mächtigen deutschen 
Reiches, wir halten noch unser Banner und stehen fest zu 
unserem Wahlspruch: „In Treue steht – mit Gott – für 
König, Kaiser und Vaterland!“ – Hurrah! Hurrah! 
Hurrah!144 
 
This account is unsurpassable in terms of nationalist and patriotic expressions. Here, the 
author pointed out the importance of the war for future generations, the bravery of the 
German soldier followed by the ultimate result – the creation of a united Germany – that was 
brought about by men like Kühnhauser. He integrated himself as part of a German nation 
emerging from the war whereby he claimed his participation in this historical event. The 
Franco-Prussian War represented, therefore, the first piece of common German history that 
the Prussian as well as the Bavarian or Würrtemberg identified with.145 Such statements were 
not rare in after-war writings and were expressed with pride about their own achievements.146      
Nevertheless, the written accounts after the war were not only positive memories of 
bravery and acts of heroism that were recalled, but also bad experiences were remembered. A 
major part in the memoirs of war veterans was devoted to the shocking numbers of casualties 
the German armies suffered during the first phase of the war; this, however, was largely used 
to further highlight the immense luck, combined with the belief of military superiority, which 
was attributed to the Germans.  
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 In many of the personal memories the soldiers had not recoiled from describing the 
devastating state of the battlefields in great detail. Whereas in letters and diaries the reactions 
of the troops towards those dreadful scenes had been rather reserved, in the written memories 
they had the vacancy to express what they have seen in the mornings after battle. Hereby, they 
were able to reflect upon experiences and to strongly emphasise the most moving details. The 
Prussian Artillery officer Friedrich Freudenthal recalled his experiences after the battle of 
Gravelotte on 18 August 1870: 
It was gruesome; we had to force our horses through rows 
of corpses, and I’ll never forget the sound of skulls 
cracking beneath our wheels and the dull thump of arms 
and legs caught in our spokes; all cohesion was lost as our 
horses frantically shied, trying to find a way around the 
dead.147   
 
This extract enables the reader to create a clear picture of how a deserted battlefield must have 
looked like in the first phase of the Franco-Prussian War. Freudenthal did not distinguish 
between French or German deaths, which suggests that there was not a way of telling who 
those dull thumbs of arms and legs had belonged to. It is, therefore, to assume that this 
description had not been written with any particular sort of patriotic thoughts. He stated the 
most devastating experience a survivor could have in its purest and most realistic form, and, it 
was imaginable that such experiences accompanied the veterans throughout their entire lives.  
 However, in a quest to initiate national thinking amongst the German population, the 
government and media had not been able to objectively judge the costs that the German forces 
had paid in blood; instead, they were utilised to excessively highlight the German suffering in 
this war for the national cause. The views that were constructed by the media and press, or 
personal environment consisted seldom of the troops’ own experiences in the war, but of 
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reflections of foreign impressions.148 Therefore, the extent to which the returning soldiers had 
been influenced by the media depended also upon the mind-sets of their relatives, who had 
been presented with war-related information in wartime and had been more vulnerable to their 
opinions being shaped by the media.149  
In displaying the dead, artists and writers often distinguished between dead German and 
enemy forces. The picture of the German as the superior fighter, the national hero who died 
for the fatherland, became especially evident in after-war paintings and publications. The 
typical motives of German contemporary war paintings included battle scenes in which the 
Germans were displayed as the victorious side. In media accounts and paintings they served 
the purpose of purporting the image of the German soldiers dying for an honourably achieved 
triumph.150 Mehrkens identified that the displayed dead German soldiers embodied three civil 
ideals: 1) the national hero who defended his life and its values with a rifle placed on his 
chest; 2) the loving father and husband holding his wedding ring; 3) the believer with the 
gesture of praying.151 This applied to all German troops independent of their region of origin. 
The actions of the German troops and the war itself had been further nationalised and 
transported to the public in form of war memorials. A memorial in Wörlitz inscribed ‘1870-71 
the heroic death for the fatherland died […]’ or another one in Winsen read ‘A lesson to 
France, an honour to Germany’; these inscriptions carried national thoughts and evoked the 
impression of national unity.152 
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In a coloured print by Georg Bleibtreu, showing Württemberg troops at the battle of 
Wörth on 6 August 1870, no visible dead can be made out.153 However, the Würrtemberg 
troops were displayed as the fearless attackers aiming at defeating the national enemy. 
Therefore, it represented an example that the determination to fight for a national cause and 
high morale was not unique to Prussian troops, but to every man who participated in the war. 
It was the German soldier, and not the Prussian or the Bavarian, who was celebrated and 
accepted as a national hero for those men had collectively succeeded in defeating France and 
equally risked their lives for the creation of a unified Germany. The real experience, however, 
looked far different than was displayed after the war by the government and media, as it had 
been examined in the previous sections.  
In summary, the memories of war participants, independent from their activity and rank, 
displayed a reflection of their experiences; hence, memoirs still displayed a ‘personal 
source’.154 However, there were a number of external influences which could significantly 
transform the thoughts about certain experiences so that particularly ordinary soldiers had 
depicted the war as an overall positive event. Influenced by their personal environment, the 
media and the government, the troops received a great deal of recognition when they returned 
from the war. This recognition displayed a positive experience, providing room for national 
sentiments and the feeling of having fought for a just cause. The German soldiers, 
independent of rank, social status or regional origin, returned home as ‘national heroes’. The 
soldiers’ written accounts after the war did not reflect their real experiences; whereas sinister 
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experiences were likely to be suppressed, the joyful ones seemed to prevail. So it came that 
many soldiers remembered most often their own heroic actions for which they had received 
the Iron Cross. The fact that the surviving soldiers were celebrated as heroes awoke patriotic 
feelings by which they easily got carried away.  
The government and the media had a great role in the fostering of national sentiments. 
The proclamation of German unity had also functioned as a catalyst for a greater national 
belief; it provided the political basis for the troops’ increasing pride of having participated in 
this historical event. Clearly, in the immediate aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, a 
common national identity had been constructed at least amongst the majority of the troops. 
Heroic accounts, initiatives by the media, the constant attempts of the government in 
encouraging national thinking during the war, and the establishment of war memorials for the 
fostering of collective memory had all played a major role in creating of a common sense of 
‘Germanness’ as it can be identified in all German states. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 and the subsequent unification displayed key events in 
the study of the emergence of a common national identity in nineteenth-century Germany. 
Resulting in the creation of a German nation, these events represented to many contemporaries 
what can be considered the first real piece of a common German history. Despite the 
prevalence of region typical customs and traditions - coined by centuries of regionalism and 
the absence of mutual political institutions – a sublime mood was evident in the majority of 
German states and provinces in the months after the proclamation of the unification. This 
notion, which had been transmitted to the troops still located in the theatre of war via field 
post, newspapers and rumours, mingled with the soldiers’ own wartime experiences and 
 
 
attitudes. However, fragments of this infectious enthusiasm had been also identified in July 
1870 through to the return of the German troops as ‘national heroes’. A reasonable evaluation 
of what soldiers had been particularly vulnerable to these external influences and how they 
developed national sentiments, before, during and after the war, derived from letters, diaries 
and correspondence cards and required an awareness of various factors. 
Togetherness despite Regional Differences – Most of the regional traditions as they had been 
typical especially for Bavaria had been persistent until today and proved resilient in spite of 
several major conflicts Germany had been involved in. However, during the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870/71, troops had been only limitedly able to practise them. Identity had been 
marked by the social structure as it was implemented in nineteenth-century German society. 
This class system had been carried into the war and remained entirely intact. So it came, that 
soldiers from the educated middle class and aristocracy, including high ranking officers and 
one-year volunteers, had been likely to make use of their status in order to gain certain 
privileges. In contrast, conscript soldiers, drawn from the lower classes, had traditionally 
obeyed to their superiors, as it had been the case in peacetime; this was particularly evident for 
Prussian troops who had been part of a long-standing military system which was based on a 
traditional hierarchical structures. If tensions between different contingents arose, they did so 
in connection with social structures and military traditions. It was particularly common for 
Prussian troops, featuring a military system with a long-standing history, to criticise Bavarian 
soldiers for their lacks in military education and training. Thus, prejudices had created certain 
negative reputations distinctive to Bavarian forces; the most commonly criticised feature 
displayed their inadequate marching speed.  
Furthermore, regarding interactions and relations between troops of different regional 
origin, there was insufficient evidence to suggest that language had posed adamant barriers to 
the soldiers or that they had practiced any social or cultural activities which can be identified 
 
 
as purely regional during the war. This was partly a result of wartime strains and insufficient 
amounts of material supplies; soldiers had to make do with very basic utensils. If soldiers had 
problems in communicating with each other and understanding the various German dialects, 
this was largely and issue of a lack of education rather than the product of cultural rejection. 
Here again, the level of education of the troops depended upon their social background and not 
subject to regional peculiarities. Social wartime activities such as the singing of songs and 
other artistic performances had been carried out by troops from all participating contingents 
alike and had a similar impact upon them: they were a welcome distraction to the strains the 
war had imposed and a motivation at the same time. 
National Identity Strengthened by Nationalisation of the Enemy – In terms of national 
identity, it can be said that the two catalysts for greater national sentiments amongst German 
troops in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, examined in the second chapter, had only partly 
succeeded. The mobilisation phase of July 1870, therefore, contributed to a type of war 
enthusiasm, involving certain groups of people in the whole of Germany; such a notion had 
not been experienced at any time before to a remotely similar extent. Although, this 
enthusiasm and euphoria had affected primarily young, educated men, its existence and 
infectious nature cannot be denied. In Prussia, evidence for this can be found in the high 
number of volunteers. Moreover, also in the Bavarian capital the mood at the outbreak of war 
had been of a positive nature. It became evident, though, that high enthusiasm had affected 
primarily the educated population in urban areas, providing officers and one-year volunteers 
for the war. Rural areas, where the vast majority of ordinary conscripted soldiers had been 
drawn from, had been largely unaffected by war euphoria. These men lacked the time to be 
concerned with great national sentiments for their worries lay with their families at home.  
Similarly, the notion of entering a war against a common enemy had been present in the 
majority of German regiments and, as the war progressed, had aided the development of their 
 
 
own identification with the German nation. Although, exceptions had existed, expressions 
about the French as the ‘national’ enemy can be found in accounts of high ranks and ordinary 
soldiers. The creation of a stereotypical enemy image included not only French soldiers, but it 
had gradually developed into a German struggle against the French nation and civilians. 
‘Uncivilised’ and ‘deceitful’ actions and fighting methods of Franc-tireurs and Turkos further 
encouraged the existing German image of the French’s illegitimate style of warfare.  Thus, the 
nationalisation of the enemy provided reasons to German troops to identify Germany as the 
‘superior nation’ and gave rise to the perception of the war as a ‘national’ one. 
External Influences upon National Identity – The Franco-Prussian War was the first German 
war in which the press had played an increasing role in the development of national identity. 
Furthermore, the writing of memoirs became a popular activity amongst veterans in the 
immediate aftermath of the war to an extent never experienced at any time before in German 
history. The memories of war participants, independent from their activity and rank, displayed 
a reflection of their experiences; hence, memoirs still represent a personal source. However, 
the authors of memoirs were able to select the information they desired to include. Genuine 
wartime experiences had been transformed by several external influences; this became already 
evident during the war, but was most apparent in the aftermath. The depiction of the war as an 
overall positive event and the perception of having participated in the fight for a German 
nation had been common features of veterans’ writings produced after 1871.   
Influenced by their personal environment, the media and the government, the troops 
received a great deal of recognition when they returned from the war. This recognition 
displayed a positive experience, providing room for national sentiments and the feeling of 
having fought for a just cause overwhelmed actual wartime strains. The German soldiers, 
independent of rank, social status or regional origin, returned home as ‘national heroes’. The 
soldiers’ written accounts after the war did not reflect their real experiences; whereas sinister 
 
 
experiences were likely to be suppressed, the joyful ones seemed to prevail. So it came that 
many soldiers remembered most often their own heroic actions for which most of them had 
received the Iron Cross. Thus, national patriotic sentiments, the identification with the German 
nation, had been evoked which obscured first-hand experiences.  
The government and the media also played an increasing role in the fostering of national 
sentiments. It is evident that the proclamation of German unity had functioned as a catalyst for 
a greater national belief; it provided the political basis for the troops’ increasing pride of 
having participated in this historical event. Clearly, in the immediate aftermath of the Franco-
Prussian War, a common national identity had been constructed at least amongst the majority 
of the troops. Heroic accounts, initiatives by the media, the constant attempts of the 
government in encouraging national thinking during the war, and the establishment of war 
memorials for the fostering of collective memory had all played a major role in creating of a 
common sense of ‘Germanness’ as it can be identified in the majority of German states.  
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